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The power the media have to (re)define politics and privilege some views over others is 
striking during election campaigns. After all, the media assemble the actors involved in the 
contest and help dramatize it by how they construct campaign coverage. The focus of this 
study is the role played by citizens and journalists as sources, and the editorial construction 
of public opinion at election time. It carries out the largest ever study of sources to date across 
five first- and second-order election campaigns in the UK between 2009 and 2017, analysing 
6647 items and/or stories, and isolating 1914 election items with 4613 different actors 
informing coverage. While most studies about media coverage of politics focus on first-order 
elections, such as Presidential contests or general elections, second order campaigns, 
including the EU elections or more localised contests, have received far less scholarly 
attention. While second-order elections might be viewed as low key electoral events, the 
outcomes still have important democratic consequences. This study examines television news 
coverage of the 2009, 2013 and 2014 EU and/or local election campaigns in the UK, as well 
as the 2015 and 2017 general election campaigns.  It explores the role of sources in different 
types of contests and compares coverage across public and more commercialized 
broadcasting systems.  
 Over recent decades, a voluminous academic literature has documented how 
journalists largely rely on institutional sources, notably political elites, which produces a top-
down perspective of the world. In characterising the relationship between sources and 
journalists, Gans (1979) famously used a metaphor of a “dance” – leaving open the empirical 
question about who is leading whom (Strömbäck and Nord 2006). But this so-called “dance” 
between sources is often theorised in the context of power relations between journalists and 
elites, a battle to lead the agenda and legitimise certain perspectives over others. Citizens, by 
contrast, have often been left out of this tussle in academic debates, despite the increasing 
presence of ‘the public’ in media discourse (Coleman and Ross 2010). However, attention 
towards the role citizens play in news programming has grown, with a particular focus in how 
they are represented in vox pops, a broadcast convention that constructs ‘the voice of the 
people’. Broadly speaking, research has shown citizens appear as relatively passive sources in 
general news reporting, while in coverage of politics they have been characterised as 
apolitical actors who are often pushed to the margins of policy debates (Brookes et al 2004; 
Lewis et al 2005). Although longitudinal research has suggested the use of vox pops has 
increased in news coverage (Kleemans et al 2015), no studies have systematically examined 
their use over different election campaigns. Nor has much attention centred on how 
journalists interpret public opinion during election campaigns (with Brookes et al 2004 as 
exception) beyond how polls are reported. Since journalists have increasingly been used as 
sources of knowledge about political affairs over recent decades (Cushion, 2015), they also 
play a critical role in how the public’s agenda is represented. So, for example, do journalists 
ideologically construct citizens as favouring right- or left-wing perspectives, or do they tend 
to avoid any ideological assertions about public opinion? 
 To develop new empirical and theoretical lines of inquiry, the purpose of this study is 
twofold: to quantitatively establish how far citizens and journalists appear as sources in 
different types of election campaigns, and more closely examine the editorial construction of 
public opinion and consider the wider implications. While a large scale content analysis was 
designed to assess source selection across first- and second-order election campaigns, in the 
2017 election campaign a more qualitative analytical framework was developed to interpret 
how journalists interpreted citizen perspectives and public opinion more generally. Overall, 
the study reinforces and advances academic debates about journalist and citizen source 
interactions. In doing so, it proposes a new way in which to theorise how citizens are used as 
sources, arguing that the public is often (re)constructed to serve journalistic narratives rather 
than convey a representative picture of public opinion  
Theorising news access: understanding sources and journalistic voice at election time 
 
Within media and communication studies, scholars have long been concerned with the 
relationship between journalism and sources. From thinking about journalists as gatekeepers 
(Gans, 1979) to labelling actors “primary definers” (Hall et al., 1978) or operating as part of 
an elite “index” (Bennett 1990), the role of sources has been theorised and empirically 
examined from a wide range of perspectives (Manning, 2001). This is because, above all, the 
access sources have to news programming represents a broader symbolic power in society 
(Cottle, 2000). In other words, whoever regularly informs the news helps represent (and 
resolve) a social reality about the world. As already acknowledged, there is an established 
academic literature that empirically shows access to news programming tends to be reserved 
for elites and institutional actors, drawn largely from the worlds of politics, business, the 
police and the military.  They not only help in constructing the narrative of news, they help 
legitimatise certain viewpoints, privileging some perspectives while marginalising or 
silencing many others. Examining television news coverage of the 2015 UK general election 
campaign, for example, Chadwick et al (2018) have theorised the source interaction between 
journalists and elites as representing “authority signalling”, elevating experts above other 
types of ‘ordinary’ sources.  
 While this might help characterise a large proportion of source judgements, it also 
excludes many actors, including citizens and public opinion more generally.  As Hopmann 
and Shehata (2011: 57) have observed, “it is quite surprising how little attention has been 
paid to ordinary citizens as actors and sources in news coverage of politics”. There is, 
however, a small but growing body of scholarship that has examined the representation of 
citizens in television news. Lewis et al (2005) have carried out the most systematic study of 
citizens in the news, which included developing a typology of how public opinion is 
represented by journalists. The most common was interferences, where journalists infer what 
the public think, followed by vox pops, which included the voices of the public and then, to a 
much lesser extent, protests or demonstrations. Reporting representative polls or surveys 
were the least referenced expression of public opinion, despite being the most accurate and 
systematic way of understanding how the public think about issues (Lewis et al 2005). 
Overall, Lewis et al (2005) concluded that citizens were represented in largely passive ways, 
with their emotional responses given greater prominence than their views about policy 
positions or solutions to political issues. 
 While many studies have examined how polls and protests have been reported – 
where the public’s view is aggregated – few have focussed on the use of vox pops or 
inferences during election campaigns, where citizens appear in coverage as sources. Beckers 
et al (2016) have studied the use of vox pops in Dutch TV news between 2003-2013 and 
discovered a large majority featured unbalanced political opinions, and that they often 
excluded minority groups, making them an unreliable measure of public opinion (Beckers 
2017). Brookes et al (2004) examined both vox pops and inferences during the 2001 UK 
general election and found while political views were balanced, much of the time the public 
was largely represented apolitically. Most people’s views were stripped of any ideological 
opinions, they argued, and were instead often used to symbolically illustrate the horserace 
between the main political parties.   
 The power dynamics of sourcing citizens is important to theorise in this context. 
Unlike expert sources, journalists are not “signalling authority” (Chadwick et al 2018) when 
invoking the public. Citizens may be used to display a range of opinions that are not 
necessarily representative, but conducive to the narrative of a journalist’s story. In the UK, 
for example, broadcasters are well aware that vox pops are not a scientific representation of 
public opinion. The BBC has guidelines that state: “We can either use a spread of opinions, 
reflecting, in a balanced way, the different strands of argument, OR, where appropriate, 
present an accurate and proportionate reflection of those whose opinions we have sought.1”  
In other words, reporters have the editorial freedom to use vox pops to serve a journalistic 
narrative rather than convey a representative picture of public opinion.  
 While there is evidence the use of vox pops has increased in television news over 
recent decades (Kleemans et al 2015), so too has the voice of journalists. So, for example, 
where once newscasts were largely pre-edited, today broadcasts are increasingly live, with 
journalists often appearing in two-ways from right around the world (Cushion, 2015). This 
represents a wider shift towards more interpretive journalism over recent decades, where a 
“greater emphasis on the ‘meaning’ of news beyond the facts and statements of source” is 
pursued by reporters (Salgrado and Strömbäck 2012: 145). Longitudinal studies have shown 
a greater reliance on journalistic opinion and comment, enhancing their editorial power while 
diminishing that of sources (Cushion, 2015). Norms of objectivity, in this context, are being 
recast as the old-age convention of relying largely on sources to inform a story is being 
replaced by journalists own judgements. For the purposes of this study, it would seem 
journalists have increasing power to infer what the public think about politics and election 
campaigns. 
 The implications of the changing dynamics between journalists and sources are the 
subject of fierce debate. After all, who sets the media agenda lies at the heart of questions 
about power and influence in a democracy. The aim of this study is to paint both a 
quantitative picture of how journalists and sources appear in news across different 
campaigns, as well as develop a finely grained, qualitative assessment of how journalists 
represent the public. In doing so, it will theorise how journalists use citizens as sources 
during election campaigns, establishing what, if any, dominant narratives emerge and then 
consider the wider implications. 
 The research questions (RQs) of the study are: 
RQ1: To what extent are citizens represented in coverage of first- and second-order 
 elections campaigns? 
RQ2: How far do journalists appear as sources in live reporting in coverage of first- and 
 second-order election campaigns?  
RQ3: How were vox pops used during the 2017 general election campaign?  
RQ4: How was public opinion ideologically constructed in live two-way reporting during 
 the 2017 general election campaign? 
 
Method and sample: examining UK election campaigns 
 
 The study drew on a content analysis of television news coverage ahead of the 2009 
and 2014 EU and local elections, the 2013 local election, and the 2015 and 2017 general 
election.2 All news on the UK national evening newscasts – the BBC News at Ten (on a 
public service broadcaster), ITV News at Ten, Channel 5 at 5pm Channel 4 at 7pm (all on 
commercial service broadcasters) and Sky News at 10pm (on a commercial broadcaster) – 
were examined approximately six weeks before each election (with the exception of Sky 
News during the local/EU elections).  There were major differences in the volume of 
coverage, with far more news about first- than second-order elections.  
 The unit of analysis was all news and election items in the sample periods. During the 
2009 and 2014 EU and local elections, as well as the 2013 local election, 2248 stories were 
generated, with 231 election news items isolated. Items refer to the type of communication 
convention editors choose to help convey a news story. This was categorised in four ways, 
including an anchor presenting an item, a reporter edited package, a live two-way with a 
journalists or a studio discussion with anchor and guests. During the 2015 and 2017 election 
campaigns all news coverage was broken down into items (N= 4399) rather than stories, with 
1683 election items identified. In total, 6647 items and/or stories were examined, with 1914 
election items isolated across five different election campaigns. Within each news item the 
type of source was then examined and categorized into party political source, citizen or other 
types of actor. This included assessing which parties appeared in coverage and categorising 
non-citizen sources, such as think tanks, academics, business people and pollsters. Overall, 
4613 sources were examined over five elections, including 2163 politicians, 1934 citizens 
and 516 other types of actor. 
 By interpreting election stories as conventions it helped convey the role journalists 
played in reporting the campaign (Cushion, 2015). So, for example, anchor only packages 
rely primarily on a newsreader summarising an item briefly over an image or moving 
pictures, while edited packages tend to be lengthier pre-filmed items that typically draw on a 
range of sources – whether politicians, experts or vox pops – with a journalist narrating and 
delivering a final piece to camera. Meanwhile, studio discussions generally revolve around a 
select few sources or a larger audience, with journalists asking citizens to contribute to 
debates. Live two-ways, by contrast, allow journalists more space and autonomy to interpret 
the campaign than other types of conventions. It is the last category – live two-ways - where 
this study will focus on examining how journalists infer what the public thinks. 
 In order to do this, a more detailed quantitative and qualitative analysis of all citizen 
sources and live two-ways was carried out during the 2017 election campaign. All types of 
citizen contributions were examined, which included vox pops, but also audience responses 
after the TV election leaders’ debates or in discussion formats (primarily on Channel 4). This 
included members of the public who had been targeted by broadcasters for more in-depth 
insights rather than more randomly asking people to comment in the high street. While these 
represented different kinds of contributions, of the 953 citizen voices analysed the vast 
majority were more typical vox pops. Each of these sources was categorised by gender and 
age, along with the topic of each contribution and voting preference. Similarly, all 169 live 
two-ways were subject to further analysis, including whether the item was about campaign 
process or issues, and the degree of policy detail information. To further explore how the 
public was represented in live two-ways, every judgement by the reporter was coded for 
being supportive/critical of the Labour or Conservative campaigns within each news item. 
Approximately 10 per cent of the samples across different strands of the election 
projects were subject to roust intercoder reliability tests dependent on the number of coders. 
All source variables and news and election item categories over the five elections reached 
high reliability scores3. In the analysis of vox pops, all variables achieved a level of 
agreement above 95 per cent and Krippendorff’s Alpha scores of above 0.84. Similarly, 
judgements about political parties in live two-ways had an 86.7 per cent level of agreement 
and a Cohen’s Kappa score of 0.83, while the representation of public opinion in live two-
ways reached a level of agreement above 88.2 per cent and Cohen’s Kappa result of 0.84. 
 
A quantitative picture of citizens as sources and live two-way reporting in first- and 
second-order election campaigns 
 
In order to explore how far journalists appeared as sources of knowledge about the election 
campaign, the study begins by examining the proportion of time they report in live two-ways 
in different types of election campaign (see Tables 1 and 2). With the exception of the 2014 
EU election, live two-ways were far less common in second than first order elections. A large 
majority of coverage – notably in the 2013 local elections – relied on reporter edited 
packages. Excluding Channel 4 in the 2017 election campaign, however, live two-ways were 
the second most frequent convention across all broadcasters. Commercial newscasts featured 
more live two-way reporting than the BBC, the UK’s main public service broadcaster.  
 The study then explored how far citizens appeared in first- and second-order election 
campaigns by looking at all sources. With the exception of the 2009 election, which was 
barely reported by broadcasters, Tables 3 and 4 show between 66.4 and 90.1 per cent of time 
was made up by political parties. Members of the public – largely in vox pops – made up the 
second highest share of time spent on sources in all five elections examined. However, there 
were more (by frequency) vox pops in the 2009 and 2014 elections than politicians. The high 
volume of vox pops was often a reflection of their ‘second order’ status, with citizens often 
used to comment about the relevance and significance of the electoral contest. The balance of 
sources used in the 2015 and 2017 UK election was remarkably similar, with almost the same 
proportion of airtime granted to political parties, citizens or other sources. Once again, 
however, the number of vox pops was close to the amount of political sources, particularly so 
in the 2017 election campaign (953 vs 956). Commercial newscasts relied on citizens to a 
greater extent than politicians. In 2015, Channel 4 sourced more vox pops than politicians, as 
did ITV in 2017, while Channel 5 featured more in both election campaigns. 
 Given the dominance of both politicians and citizens, there was limited time for other 
sources to contribute. Excluding the 2013 election, which only featured politicians and 
citizens, other actors made up between 10.9 and 13.3 per cent of airtime for sources. When 
the types of actors appearing on television news were examined more closely, there was a 
limited range of information sources identified.  
 The perceived value of different sources is revealed by the mean average soundbite 
length (in seconds) of different sources. During the 2009, 2013 and 2014 EU and/or local 
election campaigns, politicians were given more time to articulate their views (16, 39 and 
37.6 seconds respectively) than citizens (8.2, 4.3 and 7.4 seconds respectively). During the 
2015 and 2017 elections politicians also had longer average soundbites (26.7 and 32.7 
seconds respectively) than citizens (12 and 10.7 seconds respectively). While citizens made 
many appearances on television, overall they were granted little time or agency to express 
their own views. Instead, vox pops tended to be used to respond to the parties’ campaigns or 
inform the narrative of journalists’ packages. 
 Table 1: Proportion of airtime by conventions in 2009, 2013 and 2014 local and/or EU elections (by percentage, with N in brackets)* 
 BBC  ITV  CH4  Five  Total 
 2009 2013 2014  2009 2013 2014  2009 2013 2014  2009 2013 2014  2009 2013 2014 
Anchor only 23.6 
(13)  
13.4 
(8) 
14.0 
(21) 
 17.8 
(12) 
23.2 
(2) 
15.1 
(15) 
 13.0 
(7) 
14.8 
(5) 
11.0 
(22) 
 7.4 
(1) 
19.7 
(2) 
17.0 
(9)  
 
17.7 
(33) 
15.3 
(17) 
12.7 
(67) 
Reporter 
package 
76.4 
(8) 
79.0 
(6)  
81.2 
(15) 
 76.8 
(7) 
52.5 
(1) 
71.6 
(12) 
 65.1 
(4) 
79.3 
(4) 
62.3 
(18) 
 60.1 
(2) 
71.8 
(1) 
66.7 
(5) 
 
71.9 
(21) 
76.2 
(12) 
68.3 
(50) 
Live 2 way - 7.6  
(1)     
4.8  
(3)   
 5.3  
(1) 
24.3 
(1) 
13.3 
(4) 
 2.1 
(1) 
5.9  
(2)    
3.8  
(4) 
 32.5 
(2) 
8.5 
(1) 
16.3 
(3) 
 
4.0 (4) 8.5 (5) 6.4 (14) 
Studio 
discussion 
- -   - -   19.8 
(1) 
- 22.9 
(8) 
 - - 
  
6.5 (1) - 12.6 (8) 
TOTAL 100 
(21) 
100 
(15) 
100 
(39) 
 100 
(20) 
100 
(4) 
100 
(31) 
 100 
(13) 
100 
(11) 
100 
(52) 
 100 
(5) 
100 
(4) 
100 
(17) 
 100 
(59) 
100 
(34) 
100 
(139) 
*percentages in tables may not add up to 100% due to rounding 
 
 
 
Table 2: Proportion of airtime by conventions in 2015 and 2017 general election campaigns (by percentage, with N in brackets) 
 BBC   ITV   CH4   Five   Sky   Total  
 2015 2017  2015 2017  2015 2017  2015 2017  2015 2017  2015 2017 
Anchor only 3.6  
(34) 
7.1 
(33) 
 3.0  
(26) 
4.5  
(26) 
 2.7 
(18) 
2.1 
(20) 
 8.9 
(46) 
9.4 
(53) 
 7.9 
(31) 
8.8 
(18) 
 4.6  
(155) 
5.6  
(150) 
Reporter 
package 
81.8 
(137) 
79.4 
(105) 
 75.0 
(90) 
75.3 
(105) 
 59.0 
(86) 
56.8 
(93) 
 65.6 
(66) 
74.5 
(55) 
 63.9 
(69) 
65.1 
(96) 
 68.4 
(448) 
68.1 
(454) 
Live 2 way 13.4 
(37) 
13.5 
(30) 
 22.0 
(51) 
16.9 
(41) 
 17.7  
(48) 
5.8 
(24) 
 14.1  
(36) 
16.1 
(31) 
 20.1 
(31) 
18.6 
(43) 
 17.4 
(203) 
12.9 
(169) 
Studio 
discussion 
1.2  
(2) 
/  / 3.4 
(5) 
 20.7  
(22) 
35.3 
(53) 
 11.5  
(5) 
/  8.0  
(8) 
7.4 
(9) 
 9.6 
(37) 
13.5  
(67) 
TOTAL 100 
(210) 
100 
(168) 
 100 
(167) 
100 
(177) 
 100 
(174) 
100 
(190) 
 100 
(153) 
100 
(139) 
 100 
(139) 
100 
(166) 
 100 
(843) 
100 
(840) 
Table 3: Proportion of airtime by type of source in 2009, 2013 and 2014 local and/or EU elections (by percentage, with N in brackets) 
 BBC  ITV  CH4  Five  Total 
 2009 2013 2014  2009 2013 2014  2009 2013 2014  2009 2013 2014  2009 2013 2014 
Political 
parties 
74.0 
(13) 
72.5 
(7) 
47.3 
(17) 
 47.3 
(14) 
100 
(5) 
80.1 
(20) 
 37.6 
(8) 
97.4 
(6) 
71.4 
(38) 
 32 
(2) 
100 
(4) 
90.6 
(7) 
 50.0 
(37) 
91 (23) 69.1 
(82) 
Citizen/Vox 
pops 
22.8 
(12) 
27.5 
(9) 
49.5 
(54) 
 42.3 
(22) 
/ 16.6 
(12) 
 39.4 
(15) 
2.6 (4) 11.6 
(32) 
 68 
(4) 
/ 4.2 
(7) 
 37.6 
(53) 
9.0 (12) 18.7 
(105) 
Other 
sources 
3.2 (1) / 3.2 (4)  10.4 
(3) 
/ 3.3 (1)  23.0 
(2) 
/ 17.0 
(8) 
 / / 5.2 
(1) 
 13.3 
(6) 
/ 12.2 
(14) 
TOTAL 100 
(26) 
100 
(16) 
100 
(75) 
 100 
(39) 
100 
(5) 
100 
(33) 
 100 
(25) 
100 
(10) 
100 
(78) 
 100 
(6) 
100 
(4) 
100 
(15) 
 100 
(96) 
100 
(35) 
100 
(201) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Proportion of airtime by type of source in 2010 and 2015 UK general elections (by percentage, with N in brackets) 
 BBC   ITV   CH4   CH5   Sky   Total  
 2015 2017  2015 2017  2015 2017  2015 2017  2015 2017  2015 2017 
Political parties  57.9 
(231) 
 59.2 
(215) 
  71.6 
(199) 
 57.5 (177)   64.3 
(257) 
 73.2 
(299) 
 71.0 
(147) 
57.7 
(109) 
 75.1 
(201) 
62.9 
(186) 
 66.4 
(1035)  
65.5 
(986) 
Citizen/Vox 
pops 
 28.7 
(144) 
 25.4 
(198) 
  15.6 
(105) 
 27.3 (225)   25.8 
(307) 
 13.7 
(223) 
 21.2 
(170) 
35.2 
(150) 
 13.4 
(85) 
21.7 
(157) 
 22.7 (811) 20.8 
(953) 
Other sources  13.4 
(46) 
 15.4 
(77) 
 12.8 
(46) 
15.2 (71)   9.9 
(45) 
 13.1 
(68) 
 7.8 
(20) 
7.2 
(23) 
 11.5 
(24) 
15.4 
(76) 
 10.9 (181) 13.7 
(315) 
TOTAL 100 
(421) 
100 
(490) 
 350 100 (473)  100 
(609) 
100 
(590) 
 100 
(337) 
100 
(282) 
 100 
(310) 
100 
(419) 
 100 
(2027) 
100 
(2254) 
 
 
 
(Re)constructing citizen voices: The use of vox pops during the 2017 UK general 
election campaign 
 
 During the 2017 UK general election campaign, the received wisdom was that the 
Conservatives would win comfortably because most pre-campaign polls suggested the 
Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, was unpopular. But although the Labour party was between 
16 and 22 per cent behind in the polls when the campaign began, they significantly narrowed 
the margin in the run up to election day (the final share of the vote was Conservatives 42.4 
per cent while Labour received 40 per cent). By examining how citizens were represented in 
vox pops during the 2017 UK election campaign the aim is to explore if any journalistic 
narratives emerged in the construction of public opinion and consider what purpose they 
served. 
 On the face of it, a relatively balanced mix of vox pops were used across all 
broadcasters, such as an even use of male (54.5%) and female (45.5%) sources. Or in the 
broad mix of age groups (21.7% of 18-30s, 22.4% of 31-45s, 23.3% of 46-60 and 29.4% of 
61+) represented, with some unclear (1.6%) or under 18 (0.8%).Vox pops were used to 
discuss campaign process (56.8%) more than issues (42.4%) across all broadcasters, 
particularly so on Sky News where almost a third did not address policy concerns. Indeed, as 
Table 5 reveals, the two most frequently discussed vox pop topics were voting 
intention/horserace and the character or (mis)trust towards parties or their leaders.   
 
Table 5: Top 5 Vox pops topics (by percentage, with N in brackets) 
Voting intention/horserace 20.7 (197) 
Character of leaders/(mis)trust in politics 17.1 (163) 
Brexit 6.3 (60) 
Terrorist attacks 5.4 (51) 
Social policy 4.8 (46) 
All other categories  45.8 (436) 
Total 100 (953) 
 
When examining the party political balance of vox pops, 28.1 per cent were identified as 
expressing a clear voting preference (see Table 6). It showed Labour was the most favoured 
party, followed by the Conservatives, with few other parties referenced.  
Table 6: Voting preferences in vox pops on TV coverage of the 2017 general election 
Labour  35.1 (94) 
Conservative  29.1 (78) 
Liberal Democrats 7.1 (19) 
UKIP 3.4 (9) 
SNP 1.5 (4) 
Greens 3.4 (9) 
Other 2.6 (7) 
Undecided 9.7 (26) 
Not voting 8.2 (22) 
Total 100 (268) 
 
But while Labour had marginally more voter support in vox pops, an imbalance of citizen 
perspectives emerged when former voting preferences were expressed. As Table 7 reveals, 
excluding politically unclear views, the majority of these vox pops were about people 
previously voting Labour but potentially moving away from them in 2017. 
 
Table 7: Former voting preference in vox pops on TV news during the 2017 election  
Labour 60.6 (57) 
Conservative 12.8 (12) 
Lib Dems 4.3 (4) 
UKIP 13.8 (13) 
Greens 3.2 (3) 
SNP 5.3 (5) 
Total 100 (94) 
 
Of the 57 vox pops that indicated they had previously voted Labour, 52.6% (N= 30) said they 
would not be voting for them again in the 2017 election, 24.6% (N=14) said that they would 
and 22.8% (N= 13) did not make it clear either way. For the 12 former Conservative voters, 
only 2 said they would not be voting Tory again in this election, 6 indicated they would be 
voting for them again in the 2017 election while 4 were unclear. In other words, the focus on 
former Labour voters (who may, but more likely may not cast a vote for the party again) was 
not balanced with disenchanted Conservative voters. Put another way, this narrative signalled 
that voters were leaving the Labour party because of disenchantment with its leader.  
 As the previous section established, members of the public in vox pops were given 
limited time to articulate their views compared to politicians or expert sources during the 
2017 general election campaign. Further analysis shows vox pops were used editorially to 
react to the salient party political issues of the day, with journalists often asking leading 
questions that suited their narrative. The following examples reveal how journalists set up the 
question for vox pops, thus engineering a response about switching parties because of Jeremy 
Corbyn: 
 
 Journalist: A life-long Labour man, could you bring yourself to vote Tory? 
 
 Vox pops: Yes, against this fella [Corbyn]. If he’s my leader, I don’t think he’s good 
 enough to vote for… Tory, Liberal, anything but not for him (ITV, 9 May 2017) 
 
 Journalist: Pete Slaney has voted Labour for 45 years but not anymore. 
 
 Vox pops: When you get a man like Jeremy Corbyn, who will put this country back to 
 bankruptcy and let everybody in; he just doesn’t believe in this country at all (Channel 
 5, 29 May 2017)  
 
Overall, an imbalance in the use of vox pops emerged over the campaign, shaped by a 
conventional wisdom that the Labour leader was unpopular among voters. This point was 
acknowledged by one BBC radio journalist after the election – Jonny Dymond4 – who 
accepted that his use of vox pops was misleading and overlooked the growing level of 
support towards Jeremy Corbyn over the campaign. As more representative measures of 
public opinion showed (Peck, 2017), not long into the campaign the favourability ratings for 
Labour and Corbyn grew rapidly to almost the same level as the Conservative leader, but this 
was not a narrative theme in the editorial construction of vox pops. 
 
The ideological construction of voters: The role of live two-ways during the 2017 UK 
general election campaign  
 
During the 2017 UK election campaign, live two-ways made up 16.9% of airtime or 20.1% of 
all news items on the main television news bulletins. Excluding Channel 4 (because of its 
longer and more discussion-based format), live two-ways were the second most used 
television news convention. They typically lasted under two minutes, with the political editor 
or a correspondent routinely asked to deliver their views about the issues of the day.  
 Overall, 54.4 per cent of two-way items were about campaign process, leaving 45.6 
per cent focused on policy debates. Table 8 shows the top five issues addressed in live two-
ways, with horserace stories and campaign strategy the main focus. While the issue of 
terrorism was also a key area considered in two-ways, exiting the EU was the main specific 
policy issue addressed over the campaign.  
 
Table 8: Top 5 live two-ways topics (by percentage, with N in brackets)*  
Voting intention/horserace 18.3 (31) 
Campaign strategy/launch  14.2 (24) 
Terrorism  12.4 (21) 
Manifestos  8.9 (15) 
EU/Brexit 8.3 (14) 
All other categories  37.9% (64) 
Total 100% (169) 
 
Of the 169 live two-ways examined, a third – 32.5 per cent – contained no policy, while 54.5 
per cent had some. This meant just 22 live two-ways – 13 per cent – had detailed analysis of 
policy issues during the election campaign.  
 In focussing so much on the campaign, the party leaders and the horserace, a routine 
part of election coverage was correspondents making judgements about the contest or the 
public mood. These judgements were difficult to quantify and classify into different themes. 
No flagrant examples of bias or infringement of the UK’s impartiality rules were identified. 
Critical judgements about Labour and Conservative – or their leaders – appeared to be 
broadly balanced across broadcasters. However, an imbalance was identified in how 
journalists interpreted public opinion. Of the 79 supportive or critical inferences made by 
correspondents about public opinion towards the Conservative party leader, 14% were 
unfavourable. By contrast, of the 100 supportive or critical inferences about public opinion 
related to the Labour party leader, 43% were critical.  
  The narrative of negative public attitudes towards the Labour leader contrasted with 
the way his Conservative counterpart was reported. So, for example, one BBC correspondent 
questioned Corbyn’s leadership record, while another suggested that Corbyn’s plans were 
perhaps too “radical” for the British public: 
 
sometimes in an election campaign the problem that an opposition leader faces is that 
people haven’t really heard of them, they’re a bit of a blank sheet, they don’t really 
know what to make of them, it’s just about punching through to the public 
consciousness at all. But when you talk to people inside the Labour Party, in a funny 
way the problem with Jeremy Corbyn is the opposite. They fear that somehow people 
have already made their minds up about Jeremy Corbyn because of the controversial 
things he has said in the time since he’s been in charge (9 May 2017). 
  In the end, Huw, it comes down to faith, which Jeremy Corbyn has in abundance and 
 in public trust, which as of now he presently lacks and needs to build up, if this whole 
 plan is to become a radical plan for government and not simply end up as a sort of 
 curiosity left over after a failed political experiment on June 8 (BBC, 11 May). 
 
By contrast, after the launch of the Conservative’s manifesto, the claim that the party’s policy 
agenda appealed to most voters went unchallenged by a BBC reporter:  
 
 But I think more than anything, this idea of a mainstream politician for the 
 mainstream tells us that she is determined to try to scoop up votes in every corner of 
 the country, whether that’s taking votes from Labour here in Yorkshire, from the SNP 
 in Scotland, holding off the Lib Dem challenge in the south-west, or appealing to 
 Ukip voters everywhere, she wants to take on all comers, and she wants to suggest 
 that in 2017, the Tories can appeal, well, to just about everyone. (BBC, 18 May) 
 
While it might appear reasonable to assume the Conservative party was more popular than 
Labour (surveys, after all, suggested this pre-campaign), the polling evidence also showed 
that many of Corbyn’s policies were supported by the public in areas such as taxation, social 
issues and transport (British Social Attitudes, 2017). And yet, an ITV political correspondent 
suggested Labour’s policies were out of sync with most people’s political views: 
 
…if you look at the kind of policies that they’ve are putting forward, turning vast 
amounts of power to the trade unions, for example, talking openly about taxing the 
wealthy and the rich more without actually putting a figure on yet, as it were, on how 
rich you have to be to be taxed. These are policies that look ideologically pure but 
wouldn’t traditionally be seen as vote winners (ITV, 5 May). 
 
Contrary to the reporter’s judgement about what represents traditional vote winning, over 40 
per cent of the electorate did cast a vote for Corbyn’s Labour party. While there are many 
possible reasons explaining voter choice, the dominant narrative in live two-way reporting 
was that Corbyn lacked electoral appeal or proposed ideologically radical policies was clearly 
misleading. Journalists, in effect, had misrepresented public opinion and implied voters were 
ideologically more right- than left-wing. 
 
Using public opinion to serve journalistic narratives: Rethinking the role of vox pops 
and live two-way reporting 
 
 The study began by quantitatively showing citizens extensively appeared as sources in 
television news coverage of all elections campaigns examined, while journalists in live two-
way reporting were used widely as sources in first-order election campaigns. Members of the 
public, however, were given limited time to articulate their views, often featuring in brief 10 
second vox pops. By developing a more finely grained analysis of vox pops and live two-way 
reporting during the 2017 general election campaign, the study also found public opinion was 
used to serve journalistic narratives rather than paint a representative picture of voters’ views. 
There was, for example, an imbalance of party political perspectives in vox pops, with a 
greater focus on the public not supporting Labour party policies or its leader Jeremy Corbyn. 
Moreover, journalists, at times, inferred the Labour party was too radical and left-wing for 
most voters.  This was in spite of opinion data showing a majority of people broadly 
supported many of Labour’s policy proposals (British Social Attitudes, 2017). This use of 
citizens as sources can be theorised as serving the pre-conceived narratives of journalists 
rather than portraying a representative picture of public opinion during the campaign. Given 
the editorial construction of voters was so clearly out of sync with public opinion, it 
demonstrates the power journalists hold in defining citizen-source access.  Overall, the 
portrayal of citizens in television news was largely shaped by a relatively narrow set of 
assumptions made by political journalists about the public’s ideological views rather than 
consulting more objective measures of public opinion.  On one level, the study reinforces the 
findings of long-standing studies documenting the top-down nature of source interaction 
between journalists and the public, with the views of citizens often represented but largely in 
passive and limited contexts (Brookes et al 2005; Kleemans et al 2015; Lewis et al 2005). On 
another level, it shows citizens were not represented apolitically as previously theorised 
because their ideological perspectives were used to support pre-conceived journalistic 
narratives about public opinion.  
 Political journalists have long been accused of living in a ‘Westminster bubble’ or 
‘Washington beltway’, which can normalise group thinking. After all, journalists spend far 
more time following politicians than public opinion. But in more recent years, a disconnect 
between journalists and voters appears to be growing. Long-standing Channel 4 news anchor, 
Jon Snow, for example, acknowledged after the 2017 UK general election that “we 
[journalists] are comfortably with the elite, with little awareness, contact, or connection with 
those not of the elite”. He was responding to broader criticism that the news media have 
become increasingly distant from the public’s agenda. This has been fuelled by a new brand 
of partisan politics as well as new alternative online and social media platforms, which more 
aggressively point out media bias or ‘fake news’. Put simply, the news media stand accused 
of reporting politics in a too narrow and consensual way, excluding certain perspectives and 
issues that might better reflect the public’s agenda.  
 The findings of this study lend weight to this argument by not only demonstrating the 
relatively narrow party political focus of UK election coverage, but in the misleading way 
public opinion was, at times, represented. Broadcasters, of course, are highly sensitive about 
remaining impartial and their source selection is scrupulously balanced between the major 
parties. But in sticking so rigidly to the party political status quo and their increasingly 
professionalised campaigns it limited the space and time for their claims to be questioned or 
challenged by other information rich sources. Instead citizens – not experts – were regularly 
‘vox popped’ in response to the parties’ agendas. While they may be seen as a welcomed 
contrast to politicians, they bring colour but add little analytical depth to coverage. Moreover, 
vox pops remain an editorial construction of public opinion, which, in the case of the 2017 
election campaign, conveyed a misleading picture of voters’ preferences. Similarly, the 
reliance on live two-ways enhanced the interpretive role of journalists and led to voters being 
portrayed as more ideologically in tune with right- than left-wing policies. 
 The findings, overall, have a broader international relevance in debates about 
reflecting or reporting public opinion in political journalism. If broadcasters draw heavily on 
conventions (vox pops and live two-ways) that rely on the editorial judgements of journalists 
during campaigns, it promotes a form of journalism that can undermine the balance and 
impartiality of election news. After all, it gives journalists the licence to interpret the 
positioning of political parties when information rich sources might be better placed to help 
scrutinise politicians. Similarly, when journalists infer what the people think or turn to vox 
pops for a selection of views, the editorial construction of public opinion could be 
contradicted by more systematic and scientific data. So, for example, representative public 
opinion polls – beyond horserace questioning – open up one potential way of exploring 
voters’ views and preferences about issues that could shape the media agenda (Cushion and 
Thomas 2018). They could help orientate how journalists interpret people’s ideological 
preferences and convey a more representative picture of public opinion. Since 2010, for 
instance, the British social attitudes survey (2017) has consistently shown more people 
support more left-than right-wing policies, but this was not how reporters characterised the 
public during the 2017 UK general election campaign.  
 By relying more on scientific data and expert testimony during election campaigns, 
this does not mean political parties should be marginalised in election coverage. In 
representative democracies, the parties’ positions should remain central to the news agenda. 
But they could be subject to more scrutiny and be more responsive to the public’s agenda. 
More accurately engaging with people’s concerns and drawing on a wider range of expert 
views might help move broadcasters beyond the narrow set of assumptions that typically 
serve their narratives of political coverage. And, in doing so, help connect the news media 
with the public’s agenda.
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 The BBC’s editorial guidelines can be found here: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/advice/opinionpolls/voxpops.shtml 
2
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3
 In the 2015 and 2017 general election studies, all variables reached a level of agreement 
above 88 per cent, with Krippendorff’s scores above 0.73. In the 2014 EU study, a Cohen’s 
kappa test found all variables were above 89.1. The coding of the 2009 and 2013 election 
projects was part of a large study of television news. Several coders were employed on the 
project and Fleiss’s (1981) approach to intercoder reliability recorded an overall score of 
0.97. All percentage totals in tables may not up to 100% due to rounding.  
4
 Jonny Dymond’s reflection on vox pops can be found here: 
https://soundcloud.com/onnyymond/sorry-ill-try-that-again   
                                                          
